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Introduction
Observers of the European airline industry have long believed that the°ag-carrier system, though a±rming national pride, has created too many airlines and led to ine±cient excess capacity. The suggested remedy is consolidation of the European industry via cross-border mergers, an avenue that is now open as a result of EU deregulation. The¯rst major consolidation event is currently unfolding, with the proposed Air France-KLM merger recently approved by EU regulators.
Because most major international carriers belong to one of the global alliances, European airline mergers can upset the alliance structure, leading to further realignments that extend beyond the localized e®ects of the merger itself. With Air France and KLM belonging to di®er-ent global alliances, their merger is expected generate exactly this kind of secondary impact.
In particular, KLM's current alliance partner, Northwest, is expected to join the SkyTeam alliance, whose major partners are Air France and Delta, with Continental (Northwest's longtime domestic alliance partner) joining as well. In e®ect, the Air France-KLM merger will lead to consolidation of the Northwest-KLM alliance and the SkyTeam alliance, creating a mega-alliance containing four of the world's largest airlines.
The present paper o®ers an economic analysis of the impacts of this kind of merger, and the related alliance consolidation, using a stylized model of airline networks. The analysis is prompted by the concern that such a merger of carriers and alliances will generate e®ects that are mostly anticompetitive, leading to a likely negative impact on consumer welfare.
In particular, the European merger itself will reduce competition in intra-European city-pair markets and in transatlantic markets where the merger partners compete. In addition, the alliance consolidation will reduce interalliance competition for passengers traveling between 1 smaller US and European endpoints, who rely on interline service jointly provided by two alliance partners. While such passengers currently bene¯t from competition between di®erent alliances, such competition will be reduced when these separate pairings collapse into one mega-alliance.
The analysis, which makes use of an airline network model like that introduced by Brueckner and Spiller (1991), con¯rms the suspicion that the merger and alliance consolidation are harmful to passengers and to society in general. Although the setup of the model, which omits some possible e±ciency gains, may lead to an overstatement of the harmful e®ects of the merger in intra-European markets, the negative verdict on the impact of alliance consolidation seems unequivocal. The paper thus suggests that regulators should not accede to a full integration of the Northwest-KLM and SkyTeam alliances even though the Air France-KLM merger has been approved.
Although the overall negative conclusions of the analysis come as no surprise given the anticompetitive nature of the merger and the associated alliance consolidation, the results do o®er some unexpected insights. In particular, even though anticompetitive e®ects are directly felt in only a few city-pair markets in the model, fares rise and tra±c falls in almost every market served by the carriers. This outcome re°ects the existence of negative spillovers across markets, which are transmitted by economies of tra±c density. 1 With economies of density, greater operating e±ciencies reduce cost per passenger on a route as tra±c volume on the route rises. In the model, when anticompetitive e®ects reduce tra±c in a given city-pair market, tra±c density falls on the route(s) used to serve that market, raising cost per passenger on these routes. However, in a network setting, passengers traveling in city-pair markets where competition is unchanged will in some cases°ow across these same higher-cost routes, paying higher fares as a result (with a consequent reduction in tra±c volumes). Through such cost impacts, localized anticompetitive e®ects can be transmitted across airline networks, and the analysis illustrates in graphic fashion how such spillovers can occur.
In previous work, Brueckner (2001, 2003a) and Brueckner and Whalen (2000) emphasized the bene¯ts of alliances, and it is important to understand the di®erence between this view and the negative conclusions of the present paper. This previous research drew a contrast between 2 interline service provide by alliance partners and service provided by nonallied carriers. The papers showed theoretically that alliance partners should charge a lower fare for interline trips than carriers with no alliance relationship, and empirical work strongly con¯rmed the existence in the data of this alliance fare discount. The research thus established that alliances are good for interline passengers, with lower fares reinforcing any convenience gains the passengers may enjoy. 2 In the present analysis, however, these alliance bene¯ts are already exhausted because all interline passengers are assumed in the model to make alliance trips. The only e®ect of creation of the mega-alliance is thus to remove interalliance competition, without creating any new alliance travel. The appropriateness of this setup, which rules out any bene¯ts from alliance consolidation, is discussed in paper's concluding section.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the network structure of the model and explains how competition is a®ected by the merger and alliance consolidation, using two di®erent scenarios. Section 3 develops revenue and cost expressions for the carriers, making use of the setup from section 2. This section is technical and can be skipped by uninterested readers without loss of continuity. Section 4 imposes speci¯c functional forms on demand and cost and presents general results regarding the e®ect of the merger and alliance consolidation, which hold for all feasible parameter values. Section 5 o®ers a speci¯c numerical example based on representative parameter values. Extensive discussion of this example provides intuitive insight into the results generated by the model. Section 6 o®ers conclusions.
The Setup
The model has two US airlines, denoted 1 and 2, and two European airlines, denoted 3 and 4. Airlines 1 and 3 are alliance partners, while 2 and 4 are matched in a separate alliance. The carriers operate the networks shown in Figure 1 , where A, B and E denote US cities and C, D and F denote European cities. Carrier 1 uses city A as its hub and operates routes from this hub to cities B, C, D and E (the routes are indicated by the heavy solid lines in the Figure) .
Carrier 2 uses city B as its hub and operates routes to A, C, D and E (indicated by the lighter solid lines). Carrier 3 uses city C as its hub and operates routes to A, B, D and F (indicated by the heavy dotted lines). Finally, carrier 4 uses D as its hub and operates routes to A, B, C and F (indicated by the lighter dotted lines). Note that for simplicity, Europe and the US are portrayed as having only one non-hub endpoint each (E and F). A more realistic model with many such endpoints would yield results similar to those derived below.
The collection of cities shown in Figure 1 generates 15 city-pair markets, which are listed in the¯rst column of Table 1 . City-pair markets are non-directional, with travel in the market consisting of round-trip travel originating at either endpoint city (endpoints are thus listed in alphabetical order).
The base case
The base case represents the premerger situation, where airlines 3 and 4 operate independently. The following discussion explains the patterns of service and competition in the 15 city-pair markets for this case. The discussion, which also introduces a number of assumptions underlying the analysis, is summarized in the second and third columns of Table 1. Market AB, which connects the hubs of carriers 1 and 2, is served by both of these carriers, who behave as competitors. Similarly, market CD, which connects the hubs of airlines 3 and 4, is served by both carriers, who also compete for passengers. AE is a monopoly market served by carrier 1, while BE is a monopoly market served by carrier 2. In parallel fashion, CF and DF are monopoly markets served by airlines 3 and 4, respectively. Market AD is a transatlantic market connecting the hubs of carriers 1 and 4, and it is served competitively by both carriers. Similarly, airlines 2 and 3 compete in the transatlantic interhub market BC.
Market CE, which connects the European hub C to the interior US endpoint E, is served by airline 1 through its hub A and by airline 2 through its hub B. Similarly, market DE is served by carriers 1 and 2 through their respective hubs. Note that passengers must change planes at one of the hubs when traveling in these markets. In parallel fashion, market BF is served by airlines 3 and 4 through hubs C and D, respectively, with market AF served in the same fashion. It should be noted that these service patterns re°ect a key underlying assumption designed to make the analysis tractable. In particular, interline service is assumed not to occur in a market where online service is available. Thus, even though a passenger traveling in market CE could in principle take an interline trip on carriers 1 and 3 (traveling between A and E on 1 and between A and C on 3), the passenger is assumed to shun such service in 4 favor of more-convenient, single-carrier service on airlines 1 or 2. In the same fashion, interline service in markets DE, AF and BF does not occur. This constraint on service patterns, though restrictive, appears to be fairly realistic.
The remaining markets are a®ected by the alliances between the US and European carriers, which pair airlines 1 and 3 and airlines 2 and 4. Travel in market EF, which connects the interior US and European endpoints, requires interline travel, and it is assumed that passengers stay within one alliance in carrying out such trips. In other words, EF passengers°y either on airlines 1 and 3 via hubs A and C, or on airlines 2 and 4 via hubs B and D. Nonalliance interline trips combining carriers 1 and 4 or 2 and 3 are assumed not to occur. Note that the interline tra±c of carriers 1 and 3°ows across the interhub route between A and C. The airlines are assumed to divide this tra±c equally, with half of the 1{3 interline passengers on the AC route carried by 1 and half by 3. A parallel assumption applies to the 2{4 interline tra±c°owing across the interhub route BD. Finally, with the EF market served by both the 1{3 and 2{4 alliances, it is assumed that the interline EF fare is determined by interalliance competition. More detail on EF fare determination is presented below.
Finally, consider market AC, which is served in nonstop fashion by the alliance partners 1 and 3, as well as market BD, which is served by the partner airlines 2 and 4. To characterize competition in these markets, note that regulatory rulings, which allow alliance partners to collaborate in setting interline fares, typically impose a \carve-out" in interhub markets such as AC and BD. In other words, the usual grant of antitrust immunity does not permit cooperative pricing in the interhub markets, on the grounds that the presence of overlapping service in these markets makes such behavior anticompetitive (see Brueckner (2001) and Brueckner and Whalen (2000)). However, despite the presence of such restrictions, some observers doubt that carve-out provisions are actually e®ective, wondering how alliance partners can collaborate extensively while still competing in the markets connecting their hubs. Given this view, the present analysis assumes that alliance partners collude in setting fares in their interhub markets, implicitly viewing carve-out provisions (if they exist) as ine®ective. This collusion is noted in the \behavior" column of Table 1 for the base case, which indicates collusion in markets AC and BD while also showing airline behavior in the remaining markets.
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One¯nal implicit assumption underlying Table 1 should be noted. In particular, it is assumed that connecting (change-of-plane) service is never used when nonstop service is available. For example, although connecting service in market AE is feasible on airline 2 via hub B, passengers are assumed to shun such service in favor of nonstop service on airline 1. Similarly, BD passengers are assumed to shun connecting service on airline 1 via A and connecting service on airline 3 via C in favor of nonstop service on either airline. Without this assumption, which applies as well in several additional markets, the analysis would be much more complex.
Scenarios I and II
Two di®erent merger scenarios are considered in the analysis. Each scenario involves a merger of airlines 3 and 4 along with consolidation of the 1{3 and 2{4 alliances into a fourcarrier mega-alliance. Scenario II di®ers from scenario I in the degree of cooperation within the mega-alliance, which is greater under scenario II. To facilitate the discussion of the two scenarios, the merged airlines 3 and 4 are still labeled separately even though they behave like a single¯rm following the merger. While convenient, this approach is also realistic in the case of the Air France-KLM merger, where the airlines will maintain separate identities for an extended period despite their common ownership.
Following the merger, airlines 3 and 4 cease to compete in the interhub market CD, setting fares collusively so as to maximize their joint pro¯t. In addition, the two carriers collude in markets AF and BF, where they previously competed. These changes are shown in the fourth column of Table 1 .
The merger of airlines 3 and 4 spurs consolidation of the 1{3 and 2{4 alliances into one mega-alliance, mirroring the likely consolidation of the Northwest-KLM and SkyTeam alliances as a result of the Air France-KLM merger. In this case, airline 1 would represent Northwest and airline 2 would be Delta, with airlines 3 and 4 representing KLM and Air France respectively.
The main e®ect of this alliance consolidation is that the interline fare in market EF is no longer determined by competition between the 1{3 and 2{4 alliances. Instead, the fare is set collusively by all four mega-alliance carriers so as to maximize their combined pro¯t.
The additional details of the alliance consolidation di®er between scenarios I and II. Under scenario I, the interline pairings in the EF market remain as in the base case, with passengers 6 traveling either on the 1{3 carrier pair or on the 2{4 pair. Thus, even though competition between the 1{3 and 2{4 alliances disappears, interline tra±c patterns remain unchanged. By contrast, under scenario II, all four possible interline pairings are observed. In other words, in addition to 1{3 and 2{4 interline trips, passengers travel on the 1{4 carrier pair and on the 2{3 pair. As a result, the AD and BC routes, which carry no EF interline tra±c under the base case and scenario I, each get one-quarter of the total interline tra±c under scenario II. Concretely, scenario I assumes that interline passengers continue to use either Northwest-KLM or DeltaAir France despite creation of the mega-alliance, while scenario II allows Northwest-Air France and Delta-KLM interline trips to occur as well.
Consistent with a deeper alliance consolidation, scenario II also allows collusion in city-pair markets AD and BC, which were previously competitive. This outcome is plausible given that the mega-alliance will require new grants of antitrust immunity to the carrier pairs 1{4 and 2{3 (e.g., Northwest and Air France will gain immunity, as will Delta and KLM). While such immunity will allow all four carriers to collude in setting the EF fare, the previous argument against the e±cacy of carve-outs suggests that immunity will foster collusion by carriers 1 and 4 in interhub market AD and by carriers 2 and 3 in interhub market BC.
These di®erences between scenarios I and II can be reviewed by comparing the last four columns of Table 1 . Looking more generally at the Table as a whole, it is clear that the progression from the base case to scenario I and then to scenario II involves successive eliminations of competition. In going from the base case to scenario I, competition is lost in markets AF, BF, CD and EF. Further movement to scenario II involves an additional loss of competition in markets AD and BC, coupled with a change in the split of interline EF tra±c. Given these reductions in competition, one would expect that the 3{4 merger and the associated alliance consolidation is bad for consumers and good for the airlines. The remainder of the analysis is devoted to evaluating this conjecture.
Revenues and Costs
The¯rst step in this evaluation is to derive revenue and cost expressions for the airlines under the base case and the two scenarios, relying on several simplifying assumptions. 3 The 7 ¯rst assumption is that the demand for air travel is the same in all city-pair markets, with the fare p in a market given by a common inverse demand function d(Q), where Q is total tra±c in the market. As suggested above, Q gives the total number of round-trip passengers traveling in either direction in the market. Relaxing the assumption of a common demand function would introduce inessential complexity without a®ecting the main conclusions derived below.
The base case
Using this demand function, consider airline 1's revenue in the base case, which can be written as
(1)
In (1), the Q subscripts denote the individual city-pair markets in self-explanatory fashion, and the numerical superscripts denote the carriers. If a carrier chooses its tra±c level in a market in a noncollusive fashion, then only its single superscript is attached to the Q variable.
If carriers collude, then the superscript contains the identities of the carriers engaged in the collusion.
Using these conventions, interpretation of (1) With each airline operating four routes, total cost is just the sum of four separate c(¢) functions evaluated at the appropriate tra±c levels. Any¯xed costs that a carrier incurs in operating its hub can be ignored without a®ecting the analysis. Using the tra±c levels from
(1), airline 1's cost in the base case can be written
The¯rst term in (2) gives the cost of operating the AB route, which carries tra±c only in the AB city-pair market. The second term gives the cost of operating the AC route, which carries half of the tra±c in market AC (the rest is carried by airline 3), airline 1's portion of CE tra±c, and half of the EF interline tra±c of the 1{3 alliance. The third term gives the cost of operating the AD route, which carries airline 1's portion of tra±c in the AD and DE markets. Finally, the fourth term gives the cost of operating the AE route, which carries all AE tra±c, carrier 1's portion of CE and DE tra±c, and all of the 1{3 alliance's EF interline tra±c.
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While the other airlines have analogous cost and revenue expressions, it is useful to present the expressions for airline 3, as they are needed for future comparisons. The relevant expressions for the base case, which can be interpreted in a parallel fashion to (1) and (2), are given by
Pro¯t for each airline is given by revenue minus cost, and the airlines choose their tra±c levels in the various markets to maximize either individual pro¯t or the appropriate sum of pro¯ts. For example, airline 1 chooses EF again treated as parametric in Cournot fashion. This procedure generates seven¯rst-order conditions, which equate the relevant marginal revenues and marginal costs, and the analogous procedure for the three additional carriers generates additional conditions. However, the equilibrium values, which are symmetric across carriers given the symmetry of the base case, can be determined from a single set of¯rst-order conditions. 5
Scenarios I and II
The revenue and cost expressions change under scenario I. For airline 1, revenue under this scenario is given by 
The only di®erence relative to (1) is in the last term, where the Q superscript indicates that EF tra±c is now chosen collusively by all four airlines, with airline 1 getting one-quarter of total EF revenue.
Airline 1's cost under scenario I is given by C ost 1 scnI =¯rst term of (2) + c(Q
and the only di®erences relative to (2) are again related to the EF market. Focusing on the last term, the AE route carries half of total EF tra±c, and airline 1's AC route (second term)
carries one-quarter of the total. 6 Airline 3's revenue under scenario I is given by
The di®erence relative to (3) is that tra±c levels in markets CD, AF and BF are now chosen collusively with airline 4. The last term in (7) matches airline 1's corresponding EF term in (5).
Cost for airline 3 under scenario I is given by
Cost 3 scnI =¯rst term of (4) + c(Q
where the changes re°ect the di®erences just discussed. 7
The revenue and cost expressions under scenario II are not shown in detail, but the further changes are easily described. First, carrier 1 now colludes with 4 in market AD, so that the third term in (1) is replaced by (Q Using these functional forms, the¯rst-order conditions described above can be derived and solved for the equilibrium tra±c levels under any given scenario. The analytical solutions, which are computed using the Maple software package, show that the various Q's are complicated ratios of polynomials involving ® and µ. Since these solutions are not of interest in and of themselves, they are not reported.
The Impacts of the Merger and Alliance Consolidation
The goal of the analysis is to compare the base-case equilibrium to the equilibrium outcomes under each of two scenarios. This task requires comparison of the complicated Q solutions just described, contrasting the base-case solution to the solution under a given scenario. But since the outcome of each comparison depends on the magnitudes of ® and µ, which a®ect the Q solutions, a necessary¯rst step is to characterize the feasible parameter region, which contains the admissible ® and µ values.
Three admissibility requirements must be satis¯ed in generating the feasible parameter region. First, all of the equilibrium tra±c levels must be positive. Second, the marginal cost of an extra passenger on each route must be positive, a condition that in turn implies (via the¯rst-order conditions) positivity of marginal revenue and hence the fare. Third, the second-order conditions for the carrier maximization problems must be satis¯ed.
Consider the comparison of the base-case equilibrium to the equilibrium under scenario I.
Extensive analysis shows that if two particular admissibility conditions hold, then all of the remaining admissibility requirements are automatically satis¯ed under both the base case and scenario I. The¯rst of these conditions is the nonnegativity requirement on Q 1;2;3;4 EF , which says that EF interline tra±c under scenario I is nonnegative. The second condition is the nonnegativity requirement for marginal cost on the AE route in the base case. 10 When ® and µ take values such that these two conditions hold, then analysis shows that all the other admissibility conditions are automatically satis¯ed. 
Comparing equilibria
To compare the equilibrium outcomes at the market level between the base case and scenario I, the following graphical procedure is used. First, focusing on the total tra±c level in AD ). Since fares and tra±c are inversely related via the demand curve, this conclusion also implies that that the AD fare is lower in the base case than under scenario I.
Figure 3 also shows the equality locii for markets AC, AE, and AF, all of which similarly lie below the feasible region. As a result, the previous conclusion applies for these markets as well: total tra±c is higher and the fare lower in the base case than under scenario I. Analogous graphs for the remaining city-pair markets are contained in the appendix, and they show the same pattern, with all the equality locii lying below the feasible region. 11 The following conclusion is therefore established: Proposition 1. Relative to the base case, a merger of the two European carriers along with consolidation of the two transatlantic alliances leads, under scenario I, to lower tra±c and higher fares in all city-pair markets except for AB, which is una®ected. As a result, consumer welfare, as measured by consumer surplus, falls. Total pro¯t earned by the four airlines rises as a result of the merger and alliance consolidation, but social surplus, as measured by the sum of pro¯t and consumer surplus, falls.
Although the reduction in consumer surplus is an immediate consequence of lower tra±c and higher fares, the results for pro¯t and social surplus are based on computations showing that these measures are higher and lower, respectively, under scenario I throughout the feasible region. Given the loss of competition in moving from the base case to scenario I, the increase in carrier pro¯t comes as no surprise. However, the decline in social surplus shows that these higher pro¯ts are not su±cient to o®set the reduction in consumer welfare.
Exactly the same exercise can be carried out in comparing the equilibria under the base case and scenario II. 12 While details are not presented, the conclusions are the same as those in Proposition 1: Proposition 2. Relative to the base case, merger scenario II leads to lower tra±c and higher fares in all city-pair markets except for AB, lower consumer surplus, higher carrier pro¯ts, and lower social surplus.
Thus, the analysis con¯rms the conjecture stated at the end of section 2: the European airline merger and the associated alliance consolidation are bad for consumers and for society as a whole, but good for the airlines, regardless of whether scenario I or II is considered.
With comparisons to the base case covered by Propositions 1 and 2, a third exercise is to compare the two merger outcomes themselves by contrasting the equilibria that emerge under scenarios I and II. Using the same graphical methodology as before, the following conclusion can be established: 13 Proposition 3. While fares and tra±c levels in markets AB and CD are the same under scenarios I and II, fares are typically higher and tra±c levels typically lower in other markets under scenario II than under scenario I. The only exception to this rule occurs in markets AC and BD, where scenario-II fares are lower and tra±c levels higher over a small portion of the feasible region. Relative to scenario I, consumer surplus is lower, carriers pro¯ts are higher, and social surplus is lower under scenario II.
Thus, while usually amplifying scenario I's e®ects on fares and tra±c, scenario II is also worse from the point of view of consumers and society as a whole.
In order gain a better understanding of the results summarized in Propositions 1, 2, and 3, it is helpful to consider a numerical example based on representative values for the parameters ® and µ. Such an example is presented in the next section.
A Representative Numerical Example
Consider the parameter combination given by ® = 2:89 and µ = 0:11, which corresponds to a point lying roughly in middle of the feasible region in Figure 2 . Table 2 shows the resulting equilibrium Q values and fares for the three cases, while Table 3 shows the welfare measures.
Note that, while the Q values are shown at the airline level within each market, the marketlevel Q's (which are the focus of Propositions) are easily inferred. Although the absolute magnitudes of the solution values are not particularly meaningful, insight can be gained by comparing these magnitudes across the three cases, as well as within each case.
Understanding the base case
Before comparing the results across cases, it is useful to consider the patterns of fares and tra±c levels in the base case. These patterns, which are shown in the¯rst panel of Table   2 , highlight two separate factors that interact in determining the fare in a particular market.
The¯rst factor is the extent of competition in the market, with greater competition naturally leading to a lower fare, other things equal. The second factor is economies of tra±c density, with higher densities on the route(s) carrying passengers in a market leading to lower cost per passenger and hence a lower fare, other things equal.
Focusing intially on the domestic markets in the base case, note that the domestic interhub markets AB and CD have identical fares and Q's, as do the domestic monopoly markets AE, BE, CF, DF. The absence of competition in the latter markets puts upward pressure on the fare, but since the routes to endpoints E and F carry tra±c in additional city-pair markets, densities are higher than on the AB and CD routes. As a result, the absence of competition in AE and the other similar markets is partially o®set by lower costs per passenger, leading to fares that are not much higher than the domestic interhub fares (1.62 vs. 1.53).
Similarly, even though markets AD and BC are competitive like AB and CD, fares are lower, and tra±c is higher, in these markets. The reason is that the AD and BC routes carry tra±c in the DE and BF markets, respectively, along with tra±c in the AD and BC markets themselves. As a result, densities are higher than on the AB and CD routes, yielding lower costs per passenger and lower fares for AD and BC passengers.
Another notable feature of the solutions is the tra±c asymmetry between airlines 1 and 2 in markets CE. One reason for this asymmetry is the absence of any interline EF tra±c on route BC, which tends to reduce BC density relative to that on route AC. Another contributing factor is that both markets that use route BC are competitive (markets BC and CE) while one market that uses route AC is not (the AC market itself), a di®erence that tends to raise BC density relative to that on route AC. Under the given parameter values, the net e®ect of these di®erences is to reduce tra±c density on route BC relative to that on route AC. This density asymmetry, in turn, gives airline 1 a cost advantage over carrier 2 in competing for CE tra±c, which is re°ected in a higher tra±c level for 1. The positions of airlines 1 and 2 are reversed in market DE, giving 2 the higher tra±c level. All of these asymmetries are repeated markets AF and BF, yielding di®erent tra±c levels for airlines 3 and 4.
Next, observe that, while markets AC and BD are similar to monopoly markets like AE in their lack of competition, the former markets have higher fares and lower tra±c levels. One reason for this outcome is that, relative to routes AC and BD, a route like AE carries tra±c in four rather than three city pair markets and thus has a higher density (such a route also carries all of its alliance's interline tra±c rather than half; see (2)). In addition, rather than being concentrated on a single monopoly airline, tra±c in a market like AC is split between two colluding carriers, limiting exploitation of economies of density and thus raising costs. For both reasons, the fare is higher, and tra±c lower, in markets AC and BD than in the pure monopoly markets.
Finally, market EF has the highest fare and the lowest total tra±c of any city-pair market.
Although this market bene¯ts from interalliance competition, cost per passenger is the highest of any market given the need to travel across three routes in making an EF trip. Note, however, that despite these higher costs, the EF interline fare is only slightly higher than the fares for other, shorter international trips. This pricing outcome appears to be realistic and is a typical property of models like the present one (see Brueckner (2001) ).
Scenario I
With this background, consider the e®ects on the equilibrium levels of tra±c and fares of moving from the base case to scenario I. The second panel of Table 2 shows that fares rise and total tra±c levels fall in all city-pair markets except AB, as stated in Proposition 1. 14 To understand these changes, consider¯rst the European interhub market CD, where carriers 3 and 4 now collude rather than compete. The fare in this market rises dramatically and tra±c falls. Similarly, in markets AF and BF, where airlines 3 and 4 now collude, fares again rise and tra±c levels decline. Note that AF and BF tra±c is now symmetric across carriers 3 and 4 as a result of the assumption that, in colluding, they evenly split passengers in these markets. In market EF, where interalliance competition disappears, the fare again rises while tra±c falls.
Although competition is unchanged in all other city-pair markets, the downward pressure on tra±c in markets AF, BF, and EF generates negative spillovers that raise fares and reduce tra±c everywhere except in market AB. To understand these e®ects, note¯rst that the tra±c losses in markets EF and AF reduce densities on route AC for carrier 1 and on routes AC and CF for carrier 3. By raising cost per passenger, these changes tend to raise fares and reduce tra±c in markets AC and CF even though competition is unchanged. Similarly, the tra±c losses in markets EF and BF reduce densities on route BD for carrier 2 and on routes BD and DF for carrier 4, changes that tend to raise fares and reduce tra±c in markets BD and DF. The resulting density losses on the AC, CF, BD, and DF routes compound those already caused by lower AF, BF and EF tra±c.
Higher fares in markets AF and BF also reduce the tra±c that°ows along routes AD and BC on carriers 4 and 3, cutting densities. The resulting increase in cost per passenger for these two carriers tends to raise fares and reduce total tra±c in markets AD and BC, compounding the carriers' density losses on these routes. However, because airlines 1 and 2 lack a source of upward pressure on cost per passenger on routes AD and BC (i.e., no externally-caused loss of densities), their tra±c levels in markets AD and BC rise in response to the increase in fares, as can be seen from Table 2 .
While these higher tra±c levels tend to increase AD and BC densities for carriers 1 and 2, the drop in EF tra±c tends to reduce their densities on routes AE and BE. These lower densities in turn tend to increase AE and BE fares while reducing tra±c in these markets. In addition, the density losses on routes AE and BE are large enough relative to the gains on AD and BC to raise the overall costs of serving passengers in markets CE and DE, so that fares in these markets rise and tra±c levels fall. While all of these density and tra±c changes have been described sequentially across routes for heuristic reasons, it is important to recognize that they are mutually reinforcing and simultaneous, being determined by the model's equilibrium conditions.
Although spillovers from lost competition in markets EF, AF and BF thus raise fares and reduce tra±c elsewhere, the one market that is insulated from these e®ects is AB, where the fare and tra±c remain the same as in the base case. The reason for this outcome is that, since the AB route carries tra±c only in the AB city-pair market, its density level is una®ected by tra±c changes in other markets. 15 Finally, Table 3 shows the welfare e®ects of moving from the base case to scenario I. With fares rising and tra±c falling in each market except for AB, consumer surplus declines. Pro¯t levels for the individual airlines rise, with carriers 3 and 4 reaping the largest increases as a result of their individual collusion. Because the decline in consumer surplus is larger than the increase in total pro¯t, social surplus declines under scenario I.
Scenario II
The third panel of Table 2 shows the equilibrium tra±c levels and fares under scenario II, where collusion is introduced in markets AD and BC, and where EF interline tra±c is split four ways. As can be seen from the Table, movement to scenario II ampli¯es the changes already seen in moving to scenario I, with fares increasing further in the a®ected markets and tra±c showing additional declines. As a result, relative to the base case, fares are higher and market-level tra±c is lower in all city-pair markets except for AB under scenario II, as stated in Proposition 2. 16 Because markets AB and CD are insulated from the e®ects of the scenario II changes, their fares and tra±c levels remain the same as in scenario I. To understand the e®ects in other markets, observe from Table 2 that collusion in markets AD and BC dramatically raises fares and lowers tra±c levels in these markets, changes that reduce densities on the AD and BC routes. These density reductions in turn tend to raise fares and reduce total tra±c levels in the other markets that use the AD and BC routes (CE, DE, AF, BF).
However, as discussed above, higher fares in these markets tend to elicit a higher (not lower) tra±c level from the carrier not experiencing an externally-caused density loss, despite the overall drop in market tra±c. For example, since carrier 1's densities and hence costs are not directly a®ected by collusion between airlines 2 and 4 in market BC, the higher CE fare described above tends to spur an increase in 1's tra±c level in the CE market. Such an increase in turn tends to raise carrier 1's density on the AC route, tending to reduce fares and raise 19 tra±c in the AC market. Parallel observations apply to the BD market.
17
A countervailing force, however, is the AC density loss caused by shifting EF interline tra±c to routes AD and BC. If EF tra±c is large, then this tra±c loss is su±cient to nullify the gain in 1's AC density described above, so that the fare rises and tra±c falls in both markets AC and CE. The CE tra±c loss, in turn, reduces density on route AE, tending to raise the fare and reduce tra±c in market AE. With parallel negative density e®ects felt on routes BD, BE, CF and DF, fares rise and tra±c falls in all remaining city-pair markets aside from AB and CD.
While this type of outcome is the one shown in Table 2 , di®erent parameter values can generate an outcome where AC and BD tra±c are higher under scenario II than under scenario I (recall Proposition 3). Such an outcome occurs for (µ; ®) combinations near the bottom edge of the relevant feasible region, where EF interline tra±c is near zero and the loss of a portion of that tra±c from routes AC and BD is inconsequential. However, the set of parameter values leading to such an outcome represents a very small portion of the feasible region, so that the outcome in Table 2 can be viewed as representative.
Finally, Table 3 shows that consumer surplus falls further under scenario II, while airline pro¯t rises above the scenario-I level. Since the additional surplus decline is larger than the pro¯t increase, social surplus is lower than in scenario I.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the e®ects of a European airline merger followed by a consolidation of two competing international alliances. The exercise has been inspired by the Air France-KLM merger, which is expected to spur consolidation of the Northwest-KLM and SkyTeam alliances into a single mega-alliance. The results of the analysis show that, although the airlines bene¯t through higher pro¯ts, the merger and alliance consolidation harm consumers while reducing overall social surplus. The reason for this negative outcome is that, as modeled, all the e®ects of the merger and alliance consolidation are anticompetitive. First, the European merger reduces domestic competition as well as competition in markets that connect interior European endpoints to US hubs, markets that are served in the model solely by European 20 carriers. Second, alliance consolidation reduces competition in the market connecting interior US to interior European endpoints, a market that relies on interline service provided by US and European alliance partners. In the model, creation of a mega-alliance eliminates the previous interalliance competition for passengers in such markets, leading to higher interline fares and lower welfare for these passengers. Creation of a mega-alliance also leads to new collusion on transatlantic interhub routes that were previously served by competing US and European carriers from di®erent alliances.
In appraising these results, it is important to ask whether key sources of bene¯ts have been omitted from the analysis. In the interest of realism in depicting the Air France-KLM case, one possible source of bene¯ts is indeed absent from the model. In particular, following the merger, the European interhub market (CD in the model) is served by two separate airlines who collude in setting fares but sacri¯ce economies of density by splitting the market. While this depiction accurately represents the initial stages of the Air France-KLM merger, where both airlines are expected to preserve their identities, the carriers will eventually be blended into a single entity. By allowing better exploitation of economies of density, this change will enhance e±ciency and thus o®set some of the negative e®ects of lost competition.
18 However, since such e±ciency gains are unlikely to fully reverse the merger's anticompetitive e®ect, the negative verdict of the present analysis would be softened but not overturned. However, other cost-reducing synergies not captured by the simple model developed in the paper may be present, further softening and perhaps reversing the negative view of the merger's domestic impact.
Another omitted potential source of gains relates to interline passengers. In the model, all interline tra±c is carried by alliances in the premerger situation. However, in reality, it is possible that some passengers who currently make nonalliance interline trips would have access to alliance service following creation of the mega-alliance. As explained in the introduc- 
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Footnotes ¤ We thank Tom Whalen for comments. Any errors or shortcomings in the paper, however, are our responsibility.
1 Similar spillovers are present in the analysis of Brueckner and Spiller (1991) .
2 For a nontechnical overview of this research, see Brueckner (2003b) . For other research on alliances, see the book by Oum, Park and Zhang (2000), which summarizes research from a large number of journal articles on this subject written by the authors (citations can be found in the book). For other accessible overview pieces see Oum and Park (1997) and Pels (2001) . For research on alliances outside the economics literature, see Youssef and Hansen (1994) , Bissessur and Alamdari (1998) , and Dennis (2000) .
3 A reader not interested in technical details can skip this section as well as subsection 4.1 without loss of continuity.
4 It should be noted the equal division of AC and EF interline tra±c between carriers 1 and 3 on route AC in (2) does not maximize their combined pro¯t. Given economies of tra±c density, the proper tra±c allocation would concentrate on a single carrier all AC tra±c and all EF interline tra±c on the AC route. However, given that carriers 1 and 3 remain separate despite their alliance partnership, this kind of extreme tra±c allocation is untenable. The equal-split rule is imposed as realistic constraint on the operation of their alliance.
5 Note that, to avoid redundancy, the¯rst-order conditions for Q 1;3 AC and Q
1;3
EF are not be repeated in listing carrier 3's optimality conditions. As a result, carriers 1 and 3 contribute a total of 12 conditions to the complete set (carriers 2 and 4 also contribute 12 conditions).
6 By fully exploiting economies of density, the interline tra±c allocation that would maximize the combined pro¯t of the four carriers would concentrate all of the tra±c on three routes (for example, AE, AC (using either 1 or 3 but not both), and CF). Again, this allocation is unrealistic.
7 Note that AF tra±c is equally allocated to routes AC and AD in (8), while BF tra±c is equally allocated to BC and BD. Again, this allocation will not maximize the combined pro¯t of carriers 3 and 4 but seems realistic given the maintenance of separate identities for the carriers.
8 As observed previously, while EF interline tra±c should be concentrated on one set of routes 28 to maximize combined carrier pro¯t, a four-way split is more realistic.
9 It should be noted that any¯xed costs of operating a route are suppressed in this formulation, without loss of generality. While route¯xed costs should be considered in analyzing an airline's choice of network structure, where the number of routes is endogenous, the route number is¯xed at four for each airline in the present model. As a result, the magnitude of xed costs is inconsequential, generating a constant that is subtracted from pro¯t in each case. Thus,¯xed costs can be conveniently set at zero. To see how the level of¯xed costs can a®ect network structure, see Pels, Nijkamp and Rietveld (2001) . 10 Referring to (2), this condition is written 1 ¡ µ(Q 1 AE + Q 1 CE + Q 1 DE + Q 1;3 E F )¸0.
11 Since the ¢Q CE and ¢Q EF locii nearly coincide, they appear to be one curve in Figure A2 even though they are distinct (the ¢Q C E and ¢Q DE locii are identical).
12 The relevant feasible region is the set of parameter values generating admissible solutions under both the base case and scenario II.
13 The relevant feasible region is the set of parameter values generating admissible solutions under both the base case and scenarios I and II.
14 Note that BC tra±c on carrier 2 and AD tra±c on carrier 1 is higher under scenario I than in the base case. Total tra±c in each of these markets is lower, however, under scenario I, as stated in Proposition 1.
15 One additional di®erence relative to the base case is that CE tra±c is now higher on airline 2 than on airline 1. This outcome re°ects a di®erent net e®ect of the forces discussed above, which leads to higher rather than lower tra±c density on route BC than on AC, giving airline 2 a cost advantage in competing for CE tra±c. Parallel comments apply to market DE.
16 Note that, because of a round-o® convention, fares or tra±c appear to be same between the scenarios in a few cases. However, either the fare or tra±c value di®ers in every case, showing that the other variable would di®er as well if expanded to include more signi¯cant digits.
17 Analogous forces generated by collusion in the AD market tend to raise carrier 2's density on the BD route, tending to reduce fares and increase tra±c in the BD market.
18 These countervailing e®ects of airline mergers are analyzed by Brueckner and Spiller (1991, 29 
